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Abstract
Competition between political parties is a process that unfolds over time whereas formal theories of party
competition have tended to take an essentially static, or one-shot, approach. This leaves some gaps in our
understanding of the dynamics of campaigning. The aim of this paper is to make up some of this gap. This
is done using a differential game theory model to analyse a situation in which support for a party depends
on the amount spent on marketing relative to the expenditure of the other party. One of the main results is
that, even when voters are not myopic, the logic of the competition forces parties to accelerate expenditure
on campaigning during the period between elections.
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1 Introduction
Social scientists are fully aware that competition between political parties or candidates for election is a
dynamic process in which resources, such as energy and funds, are spent over time in trying to win voter
support but, so far, most existing studies of campaign expenditure are static and we have very little by way
of a theoretical understanding of these dynamics. This is, in fact, part of a larger shortcoming in the analysis
of the dynamics of electoral competition.1 This paper attempts to help fill some of the gap in our formal
theories. It is concerned with the dynamics of resources spending in the period between elections. I fill out
the term ’resources’ subsequently.
The types of questions that are of concern might be illuminated, in a preliminary way, by considering
some casual observations about the way in which parties, or candidates, spend resources in trying to market
themselves to voters.
(i). The first is that, for political parties, campaigning seems to be a constant activity throughout the period
between elections and that the effort spent on trying to sell a favourable image of candidates and policies
tends to increase as the election approaches [17], ([39], 61). Whitely and Seyd [40] describe the underlying
pattern by dividing the campaign into three periods. These are the long period which starts at the end of
the last election and lasts throughout followed by a subsequent medium and then a short term campaign.
Similarly, in presidential elections candidates seem to accelerate expenditure as election day approaches ([21],
77). Although the observation that expenditure increases through time might seem too obvious to warrant
consideration, it is only one possible trajectory. The question is, what explains this observations, or in fact
any other trajectory? Is there any reason why expenditure should increase over the electoral period? Why
not spend all resources at the beginning, or the end?
(ii). Secondly, it has been noted that here sometimes seems to be a correlation between the expenditure
of candidates. This observation is again fairly casual. It has recently been tested in some work by Box-
Steffensmeier [6] for the 2000 presidential election. This shows that Bush’s expenditure increased in response
to increases in expenditure by Gore. Why should the fact that one candidate has increased its expenditure
cause the other candidate to increase?
The specific purpose of this paper is to help answer some of these questions. This is done by examining a
fairly stripped down model of the dynamics of campaign expenditure in a competition between two parties
or candidates.
In order to concentrate on the influence of competition on the dynamics of resource expenditure the
model is constructed to abstract from the impact of personalities and other unique events. It also assumes
that the determinant of support has two components. The first is fixed by partisan identification or per-
ceptions of the economy or some other factor that does not change during the period. The second is the
variable component which increases with the amount of resources spent on campaigning for a fixed level
1The comment is often made, for example, that most studies of campaign expenditure are static or ignore the temporal
properties of data when it is available [6], [7], [4] and standard texts on party competition such as [27] and [?] do not mention
time. This situation is changing with the increasing availability of data and popularisation of techniques to deal with time
series analysis [3], [15], [8].
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of expenditure by the opposition. This is consistent with the substantial body of work that indicate that
many voters are responsive to advertising and that support increases with campaign effort [6], [32], [18],[29].2
In one sense the level of abstraction in this paper is higher than in some existing static models because
of the complexity of the dynamic analysis. As with much of life, gains in one direction are bought at a cost
in some other. It might be hoped that some of these abstractions could be reduced in future developments.
Although the model deals with competition for support in general, the reference in what follows will
usually be to parties in order to save repetition. The findings hold for candidates in other systems, with
obvious local modification, and some of the empirical data on support for parties, or candidates, is from
work done on these systems.
The main result of the analysis is, roughly, that, under most of the conditions studied, the government
and the opposition increase their rate of resource expenditure on marketing through the entire period be-
tween elections and the opposition spends more than the government in every time interval. The case which
strikingly sums up the most important lesson of the analysis is where parties start out with equal support
and the cost per unit of impact on the electorate is the same. In a simultaneous move game both parties
have to spend more and more at each instant in order to retain their initial levels of support. This is often
known as the Red Queen effect.3 This stands in sharp contrast to the hypothetical one horse race. Where
only a single party tries to buy votes, and the electorate is not myopic, it spends at a constant rate for the
entire time period.
It is also shown that changes in the level of support for the parties depend, roughly, on the cost per unit of
impact. If the cost is high for the government, relative to the opposition, the government allows its support
to decrease. If this is low it may pay it to spend resources in order to increase its support through the entire
interval.
In addition it is shown that when the cost per unit of impact is the same for both parties it pays the
opposition to try harder and devote more resources to building support than the government. Although
results are given for all cost structures, the case where the relative cost of impact for the government is
higher than that of the opposition is of most interest since it is frequently argued in the literature that this
is the usual situation [29] [17] [20]. In this case it pays the government to increase its spending at a faster
rate than the opposition.
A rough intuitive interpretation of these results goes as follows. A single party will spend at a constant
rate to avoid the costs associated with trying to change support rapidly in any period. If there were two
parties and party one spends evenly across the entire period, or more at the beginning party two is better off,
and party one is worse off, when party two spends little during the early part of the campaign and increasing
2See [17] for a discussion of some of the problems in an empirical test of the relation between spending and support. For a
discussion of the continuing relevance of economic factors and party support see [31]
3It gets its name from the Red Queen’s comment to Alice that, ’here, you see, it takes all the running you can do to keep
in the same place.’ [10].
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amounts on converting the electorate towards the end. If, on the other hand, party one were to defer all
its expenditure until near the end of the campaign its opponent could do better by building up support at
an increasing rate. Party one would then find that it would cost more to reduce its opponent’s support in
the final period than if it had been spending earlier. If party one spends resources on building support at
an increasing rate throughout the entire period, the opposition can do no better than follow a similar strategy.
As far as I am aware there are no similar studies in the political economy literature. There is some work on
competitions between oligopolies in discrete time such as [37] and [34] and in continuous time such as [19] and
[11] that have some parallels. Of these, this paper is closest to [19], but differs in assumptions and approach.4
I set out the paper as follows. In section §.2 the model of party competition is specified. This is analysed
in sections §.3 for one party attempting to buy support. It is analysed for competition between the parties
in §.4− §.6 under different assumptions about information and strategies of the parties.
2 The model and discussion of the problem.
Suppose there is a political system with two parties and that each spends an all purpose resource on mar-
keting its image over a continuous time period running up to an election in order to maximize its support
at this election.5 This time period covers the entire duration of campaigning activity and is not restricted
to the final few weeks running up to an election. The resource that is allocated includes finances and the
time and effort of the candidates, volunteers, and party members. The activities on which resources are
spent are things like appearances at public functions and talk shows, low level advertising, consultation with
groups, research, selling policies to various constituencies, attending cake stalls, and listening to complaints.
Time spent on these activities is costly in the sense that there are other opportunities lost, or leisure and
private income sacrificed. It is assumed, for simplicity, that these different types of resource expenditures
can be expressed in a common monetary scale. There is a cost attached to spending resources. There is no
limit on the amount that can be spent, however, because it seems reasonable to assume that parties can run
up debts in money and goodwill.6 It is also assumed that the image of the parties and, to a lesser extent,
their policies are fixed in the period running up to an election. This simplification is intended to make the
analysis tractable. Although party positions and policies may vary from one election to the next [9], [1] it
is assumed that there is sufficient consistency in views of what the parties stand for, and their policies, to
make this a reasonable first approximation for any one period between elections. In order to accommodate
policy changes of sufficient magnitude to alter a party image it might be imagined that they take place prior
to the campaign period.7
4Among the main differences are that I study the situation where there is a finite termination time and produce results for
different information structures.
5It would be possible to see parties as firms with the main activity of marketing an image of themselves which they have
produced at no cost.
6See ([39], 208-9) for a discussion of the importance of the activities of members and the role of voluntary activity as
substitutes for other forms of campaign expenditure.
7See Budge [9] for a discussion of long run consistency in party images and variations in policy in individual elections from
one election to the next.
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The assumption that parties wish to maximize support at the time of the election captures the idea that
the level of representation in the current legislative period is of value for itself and for its contribution to
credibility and future elections. This assumption is consistent with early work on modelling electoral compe-
tition by Stigler and by Crain [33], [12]. It gives a continuous payoff function rather than the discontinuous
payoff associated with the assumption that getting a majority is all that matters.
It is assumed that support for a party increases at a declining marginal rate with the amount of resources
spent on marketing, doing good deeds and other forms of promotion, everything else constant. It might
be imagined, for example, that each party has a natural constituency and that the closer a voter is to this
constituency the more easily it is won over by the efforts of that party. As a voter gets further away, more
effort is required to gain support. This assumption combines some elements of the Michigan model, which
assumes that party identification is largely fixed, and the more recent literature which claims that many vot-
ers are responsive to advertising and that support for a party increases with campaign effort as required for
my model [6], [32] [18].8 In this case fixed party affiliations are replaced with the idea that it is increasingly
costly to dislodge voters.
The strategies available to the parties depend on the information available and this introduces some subtle
points to do with observation and responses over time that don’t feature in the analysis of static games.9
It is also possible that parties may formulate their strategies at different times. The following possibilities
seem the most interesting.
A1. The parties formulate their expenditure programmes for the entire period at time zero. This might be
explained by the long lead times needed to map out legislative programmes, to organize public engagements,
to negotiate and meet with pressure groups, to set up public events, and to mobilize support from members.
It might also be explained by uncertainties about the value of the information received during the competi-
tion. This gives an open loop competition.
A2. Parties might change their strategies at each instant in response to information on the effect of their
actions, and those of their rival, on the level of support. This requires considerable flexibility. It gives a
closed loop memoryless state feedback competition.
A3. One party might delay its planning until the other has formulated its campaign. In this case one party
is the leader and decides on its expenditure of resources knowing that the other will then choose a pattern
of expenditure to get the greatest share of support for itself. This gives an open loop Stackelberg game. It
seems natural, although not necessary, to assume that the government, or incumbent, moves first.
In order to get a complete analysis we need to look at each of these. It is not possible to tell, in advance,
how the trajectories will vary in each case.
The most natural way to analyse the dynamics of this situation, and the one that has considerable ad-
vantage from the viewpoint of mathematical elegance, is as a differential game in continuous time. Even if
8See fish for a discussion of some of the problems in an empirical test of this.
9See ([2], 227-8) for a detailed discussion of information.
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parties to adjust their expenditure at discrete intervals there may be so many of these that they are best
approximated continuously. On the other hand, many political economists will be more familiar with static
or discrete time optimization problems and it may be useful to give some pointers about what is happening
in these terms.10
In order to specify the model, let subscripts 1 and 2 refer to the government and opposition respectively.
Time is written t for t = 0, 1. The resource expenditure of the government at time t is u1(t) and of the
opposition is u2(t) and the cost of expenditure is fi(ui) for i = 1, 2. The natural constituency of party i is
written qi and, for simplicity, let q1 = q2 = q. Without loss of generality change coordinates to set q = 0.
The number of supporters for the government at time t is written z1(t) and for the opposition z2(t). The
fraction of support is x(t) = z1(t)n and y(t) =
z2(t)
n . Assume that n is sufficiently large that x(t) can be
approximated as closely as we wish by a smoothly differentiable function. This is also written x(t) to save
notation. Since gains for the opposition are losses to the government y(t) = (1 − x(t)). For the simple two
period model the dynamics of support for party one could be written as
x(t+ 1)− x(t) = k1(1− x(t))u1(t)− k2x(t)u2(t) (1)
where the parameters k1, k2 > 0 capture the idea that the voters may respond differently to expenditure by
each party [29], [17], [20].
In this case, the problem for party one is to maximize x(2) and for player two to minimize x(2). Note
that the firms are only interested in the payoff at the terminal time but that the costs of expenditure will
be incurred across the entire time period. This means that, since x(2) is the support for party one in the
final period the problem for each player is to maximize
J i =
1∑
t=0
fi(ui(t)) + θix(2) (2)
where i = 1, 2 and θ = 1 for i = 1 and θ = −1 for i = 2.
In order to solve this game we proceed backward from the values of ui(1) that maximize x(2) to obtain
the maximum expenditure at each step.
The continous time game can be thought of as an extension of this idea across an arbitrarily large number
of time steps. In order to specify it we take advantage of the fact that x is smoothly differentiable and write
the effect of spending by the government and opposition on the rate of change in support as11
x˙ = k1(1− x)u1 − k2xu2 (3)
where x˙ = dxdt . Reference to time arguments are supressed unless they are needed to simplify the notation.
10I owe the idea of discussing the model in this stripped down form to John Roemer.
11The equation for the dynamics could easily be extended to take into account things like a natural rate of growth in support
for one of the parties. As it stands it is similar to the Lanchester model. See [19] for references and a discussion.
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For tractability the payoff functions, f i, are simplified and the sum of costs is dealt with in continuous
time by writing it in integral form. It is assumed that the parties attempt to maximize payoff functions of
the form
J i = −
∫ 1
0
ci
2
u2i dt + θix(1) (4)
for i = 1, 2 subject to the dynamics in equation (3). ci > 0 is a paramater that captures any differences in
the cost to each party of spending resources and this may depend on such things as the level of donations,
availability of voluntary labour and so on. In many cases information on costs will be coarse owing to the
different influences on cost. In addition it will also be interesting for analytical purposes to assume c1 = c2.
Since we are dealing with time as an interval, and not units, the period between elections has been normal-
ized and set at one.
It is assumed that a winning majority is m¯ ≥ n2 + 1 and hence that x(0) ≥ 12 where equality ocurs when
support is tied. Party support, as opposed to actual votes, could be tied for any number of reasons. Maybe
a supporter of the opposition forgot to vote, or submitted a spoiled ballot, for example.
Before analysing the competition between the parties I consider the dynamics for the one horse, or single
party, race. This is, of course, not meant to capture any actual situation. It is meant to provide a point of
comparison to help answer the question, how much of the trajectory of party expenditure is produced by
the dynamics of competition?
3 The optimal expenditure without competition.
The election is contested by a single party. In this case the optimal use of resources is to spend at a
constant rate throughout the entire period. Any deviation from this can be attributed to the effects of
competition between the parties. In order to show this the simple two step model is first analysed. I then
prove it for the more general continuous time case.
The dynamics of the two step model for the single player are obtained for the closed loop case by modifying
Equation (1) to get
x(2) = x(1) + k1(1− x(1))u1(1) and x(1) = x(0) + k1(1− x(0))u1(0)
and using the appropriately modified specification for the payoff function in Equation (4) the problem is to
maximize
J1 = −u1(0)
2
2
− u1(1)
2
2
+ x(2)
Substituting from the second equation for the dynamics into the first and using the known value of
x(0) = β gives
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x(2) = β + k1(1− β)u1(0) + k1(1− k1(1− β)u1(0))u1(1)
Differentiating J1 with respect to the controls gives
u1(ρ) = k1(1− β)− k21(1− β)u1(ρ¯)
for ρ, ρ¯ ∈ {0, 1} and ρ 6= ρ¯ and hence
u1(0) = u1(1)
as required for constant expenditure in each period.
In the continuous time case the dynamics are given by
x˙ = k1(1− x)u1
and the payoff function is J1 in Equation (4). In order to deal with this either the Pontryagin principle for
the open loop game in A1 or the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the closed loop game in A2 will be
used. Since the solutions will be the same, in this example, for either of these approaches the open loop case
is solved for illustration.
The Pontryagin principle gives the necessary conditions that a piecewise differential optimal path of
expenditure must follow in continuous time [24]. It can be thought of as a means of incorporating the effect
of a change in expenditure at each instant on the value at that instant and on the value at all future times.
In order to apply this we need to form the Hamiltonian
H = −u
2
1
2
+ αk1(1− x)u1
where α(t) is a costate variable and is required to be piecewise continuously differentiable. It can be loosely
thought of as the marginal value of an increase in support at time t. The necessary conditions for an internal
solution are
u1 = αk1(1− x)
and
α˙ = αk1u1
Differentiating the first of these equations with respect to time gives
u˙1 = α˙k1(1− x)− αk1x˙
and substituting gives
u˙1 = 0
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as required.
It is worthwhile noting that this result is not limited to the specific assumptions made about the dynamics
of support. It can be generalised to any specification of the dynamics of the form x˙ = g(x)u.
With this result in mind we can now consider what happens in the competition for support.
4 A 1. The open loop competition.
The government and the opposition formulate their strategies at the beginning of the game and the op-
timal programme for each party is to accelerate its expenditure for the entire time period. This gives an
immediate, and important, difference between the dynamics of the two party competition and the optimal
programme for a single party. The way in which the trajectory of support changes along an optimal path
depends on a parameter that captures the relative cost of influencing voter support, called the impact cost
index. When the cost index and support are equal we get the Red Queen effect. If the government’s relative
cost is sufficiently low support increases. In what seems to be the more usual case, where the government’s
cost per unit of impact is high relative to that of the opposition, support for the government is decreasing
throughout the entire period. It is interesting to see that the government accelerates its expenditure faster
than the opposition. This tells us that, from the government’s perspective, it is better to spend relatively
more near the end of the campaign. What needs to be done is to prove all this.
In order to use the Pontryagin principle in this case we form the Hamiltonians
H1 = −c12 u
2
1 + α1( k1(1− x)u1 − k2xu2) and H2 = −
c2
2
u22 + α2( k1(1− x)u1 − k2xu2) (5)
where αi for i = 1, 2 are the costates and are required to be piecewise continuously differentiable. The details
of the analysis are in Appendix 1. The necessary conditions that a piecewise continuous optimum control
must satisfy for an interior solution are
u1 = α1
k1
c1
(1− x) and u2 = −α2 k2
c2
x (6)
α˙1 = (k1u1 + k2u2)α1 and α˙2 = (k1u1 + k2u2)α2 (7)
where α1 = −α2 = α for i = 1, 2. Differentiating and substituting gives
u˙1 > 0, u¨1 > 0, u˙2 > 0 and u¨2 > 0 (8)
which means that ui is increasing at an increasing rate for all t for i = 1, 2.
Substituting Equation (6) into Equation (3) give the trajectory of support for the government as
x˙ = α(
k21
c1
(1− x)2 − k
2
2
c2
x2) (9)
along the optimal path. It follows that x˙ has the same sign as
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ψ = 1− 2x+ x2(1− σ)
where
σ =
k22
c2
/
k21
c1
For x ≤ 1 the positive root for ψ is r = 1−
√
σ
1−σ σ 6= 1 with ∂r∂σ < 0. It follows that for x < r we have x˙ > 0 and
for x > r we have x˙ < 0. What this tells us immediately is that, the fraction of the support for party one is
always either increasing, decreasing or stationary. See fig. (1a). It will also be noted that limσ→1ψ = 12 and
ψ is continous.
It is possible to get a better picture of what is happening, and to set up an important parameter for the
analysis, by rewriting σ as c1
k21
/ c2
k22
and interpreting c1
k21
as an index of the cost of impact of the government’s
expenditure on campaigning, with the analogous interpretation for the opposition. Even though we are
working with k2i the index will have the required properties for changes in ci and ki. Call this the impact
cost index. This allows us to interpret σ as the ratio of the cost of impact of the government’s campaign
expenditure over the cost of impact of the opposition’s expenditure. This may vary because voters are more
receptive to opposition messages, or beause one party might deal with their advertising in a more cost effec-
tive manner than its opponent [29], [17] [20]. This gives three cases to consider.
Figure 1. The dynamics of support for party one.
Case 1. Equal impact cost index. σ = 1.
(i). The parties are symmetrical in the sense that each is supported by half the population at the beginning
of the electoral period. It is immediate from Equations (6) and (9) that
x˙ = 0 and ui = u2
which means from Equation (8) that, like Alice and the Red Queen, each party is spending more and more
as time progresses in order to stand still.
(ii). The government has more initial support than the opposition and it is assumed that the coefficients
in the dynamic equation are the same and k1 = k2 = k¯ for k¯ > 0 a constant. In this case expenditure
for the opposition is higher than that for the government for the entire period. In other words, it pays the
opposition to try harder. In addition
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x˙ < 0
for all t and the fraction of total support for the government falls for the entire period. In addition it can
be shown that x¨ > 0 to give the trajectory in fig. (1b). See Appendix 1.
To get the results for the dynamics of resource expenditure use the trajectory for x together with Equation
(6) to give
u1 < u2 and u˙1 > u˙2
for all t ∈ [0, 1) as required. See fig. 2 for an example. It is also possible to get explicit solutions for x and
ui for i = 1, 2 for σ = 1 for all t, if these are required.
Case 2. Impact cost index of the government less than the opposition. σ < 1.
The government’s support increases for all t for σ sufficiently small and, for the special case k1 = k2 = k¯,
expenditure by the opposition is increasing faster than expenditure by the government. To see this note
that for σ = 0 we have r = 1 and as σ increases r decreases with r → 0 as σ → ∞. It follows that, for σ
sufficiently small, x(0) < r and x˙ > 0 for all t. See fig. 3
Figure 2. Trajectories of reource expenditure for equal impact cost indexes .
To get the relation between the trajectories of expenditure for the government and opposition note that, for
k1 = k2 = k¯, it follows immediately from equation (3) that u1 > u2 for all t. Using equation (6) and writing
ρ = u1 − u2 and differentiating gives ∂ρ∂x < 0. This means u1 − u2 < 0 as required.
Figure 3. Example of trajectories for r(σ).
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Case 3. Impact cost index of government greater than the opposition. σ > 1.
In this, the more usual, case support for the government is decreasing and, for k1 = k2 = k¯, the government
is increasing its expenditure faster than the opposition. To begin note that for σ ≥ 1 we get x(0) > r and
x˙ < 0 for all t as in fig. 3.
When k1 = k2 = k¯ equation (6) gives u1(0) < u2(0). Since ∂ρ∂x < 0 we now have u1 − u2 increasing.
5 A 2. The closed loop game with equal impact cost indexes. σ = 1.
The parties now adjust their advertising expenditure according to the level of support at each instant as
revealed by polls and other information sources to give a closed loop game with state space information.
This is rather more difficult to analyse than the previous case and results are only produced for k
2
i
ci
= k
for i = 1, 2. The general result in this case is that the trajectory is essentially the same as the trajectory
in the open loop case. Where the government and the opposition have the same initial level of support we
again see the Red Queen effect and for k1 = k2 = k¯ the opposition spends more than the government as
before. An unexpected feature of this case is that parties spend less on campaigning at each instant and
hence across the entire time period than in the closed loop game, even thought the end results are the same.
With the benefit of hindsight we can see that, if parties are able to adjust their strategies at each instant,
they must be able to do at least as well as, or better than, they can if they are not able to adjust. Each
party can constantly monitor the other’s activities and will tend to fine tune its expenditure according to its
opponent’s moves at each instant. If parties have to commit themselves at the beginning of the game they
do not have the possibility of this fine tuning.
In order to solve this problem it is necessary to use the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation to take into
account the feedback between support at each instant and the expenditure of the parties. Write the value of
the game for player i from time t and initial condition x0 as ωi(t, x0) and the partial derivative of ωi with
respect to any variable z as ωiz. The details of the analysis are in Appendix 2. This gives us
−ω1t = max u1(−
c1
2
u21 + ω
1
x(k1(1− x)u1 − k2xu2)) (10)
with the analogous expression for ω2t .
The partial differential equation in (10) is solved in Appendix 2 in terms of ϕi(t) where ϕi has the same
place in the dynamics as αi in the open loop game. This gives
ϕ˙ =
3k
2
ϕ2 (11)
and this can be used to get explicit solutions for x and ui.
Comparison of open and closed loop strategies.
The general result is set out below. Paths are said to have the same profile if they have the same sign and
11
the same first and second derivatives for every t.12
Proposition 1. For σ = 1 the trajectories for x and ui for i = 1, 2 in the closed loop game have the same
time profile as the open loop game with u1 < u2 when k1 = k2 = k¯.
Proof. Since ϕ1 = −ϕ2 we have ωix = ϕi with the same place in the dynamics as αi and x is bounded away
and above x = 12 for all t ∈ [0, 1) in both games. In addition u1 < u2 in both games. In order to get the rest
of the profile compare equations (17) and (11).
Since ϕ(1) = 1 we have α > ϕ from equations (17) and (11) for all t and ui(0) greater in the open loop
game than in the feedback game. In order to support the statements at the beginning of the analysis of this
case we look at explicit solutions to the equations for the case where > 12 . This gives
(i). Support for the government is always higher in the closed loop than in the open loop game with the
highest level of support at approximately t = 12 and the level of support roughly equal for t = 1 in both
games. See fig. 4 where $(t) = xc(t)− xo(t) where xc and xo are support for the government in the closed
loop and open loop games respectively.
(ii). Government expenditure is higher for all t in the open loop game than the closed loop game with the
maximum difference at approximately t = 12 .
(iii). Opposition expenditure is higher for all t in the open loop game than in the closed loop game with the
maximum difference at t = 0.
6 A 3. The open loop competition with the government as a leader.
The government formulates its strategy first and the opposition responds. This is the most difficult case
to analyse, but we might hope to get the most important characteristics of the trajectories. As in case A1
support for the government depends on the relative cost of impact for government expenditure. If relative
cost is sufficiently high support will be decreasing along the optimal path although there is a possible case
where it decreases and then increases. If the relative cost is low support for the government will increase.
The opposition increases its expenditure for the entire time period. It can also be shown that the government
is increasing its expenditure at the beginning and end of the time period.
Figure 4. Difference between trajectory of support in closed loop and open loop games for$(t) = xc(t)−xo(t).
12A similar sort of result is obtained by Fruchter [19] for an infinite horizon duopoly market.
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The solution to this problem is similar to the open loop game. In this case the Lagrangean for the
government is
L1 = −c1u
2
1
2
+ α3( k1(1− x)u1 − k2u2x) + α4(−∂H2
∂x
) + α5
∂H2
∂u2
(12)
with H2 given by equation (5) and the α(t) terms again being costate variables with properties given in
Appendix 3. This gives us the necessary conditions for an internal solution as
u1 = α3
k1
c1
(1− x) + k1α2α4 and u2 = −α2 k2
c2
x (13)
In a similar manner to the previous analysis of {x : x˙ = 0} we get x˙ < 0 if x > r¯ and x˙ > 0 if x < r¯ where
r¯ = (1−
√
σe
k2
2
c2
(1−t))(1− σe
k22
c2
(1−t))−1.
Rewriting k
2
2
c2
= k˜ and σ¯ = σek˜(1−t) and doing some work on the derivative to get the sign gives ∂r∂σ¯ < 0
and ∂σ¯∂t < 0. This gives a similar analysis to the open loop game with the additional time dynamic given by
the fact that, for σ given, r¯ increases as t increases. This means that we cannot rule out the possibility that
x˙ switches sign and support for the government starts to increase at some t < 1. See fig. 5 for an illustration.
This again gives three cases to analyse.
Case 1. Equal impact cost indexes. σ = 1.
The government’s support initially declines along the optimum trajectory, but may increase near the end of
the time period. The opposition starts by spending more than the government and increases its expenditure
for all time and the government also increases its expenditure for some time interval near the beginning of
the campaign. For the specific case where kici = 1 the government also increases its expenditure in an interval
near the end of the campaign.
To analyse the trajectory of support note that the positive root is now r¯(k, t) = 1−e
k˜(1−t)
2
1−ek˜(1−t) . Taking the
limit as t→ 1 gives r¯(k, t)→ 12 and since ∂r¯∂t > 0 we have r¯(k, 0) < 12 . This means that x˙(0) < 0. For some
x(0) sufficiently close to one half it must be the case that x is increasing in the vicinity of x = 1 as in fig.5.13
Figure 5. Example of trajectory for σ = 1.
13If required we could get x(t) for specific parameters by solving the two point boundary value problem for equations (3),
(22), (23) with the value for α given in (19). See Roberts and Shipman, [30] for example.
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It is straightforward to analyse the resource expenditure of the opposition since it will follow the same
path as the open loop game to give
u˙2 > 0 and u¨2 > 0
for all t. It can also be shown from the analysis of the costates and Equation (13) that
u2(0) > u1(0)
as in the open loop game.
In order to analyse the resource expenditure for the government consider the special case where ki = ci = 1
for i = 1, 2. Since the relative values for the α(t) terms are either known or can be obtained at t = 0 and
t = 1 we evaluate u1 at these points. Differentiating u1 and using values for the α terms gives
u˙1(0) > 0, u¨1(0) > 0 and u˙1(1) > 0, u¨1(1) > 0
This might suggest that the government is accelerating its expenditure for all t but, even though this
seems plausible, I do not have a proof.
It is also noted from equation (6) that the final level of expenditure of the government in the Stackelberg
game is greater than in the open loop and closed loop games for the same level of x(1).
Case 2. Lower impact cost index for government. σ < 1.
Support for the government is increasing for all t for σ sufficiently small. To see this observe that we can
make r¯(k, 0) > 1−  for some  as small as we wish by letting σ → 0. The trajectory of expenditure by the
opposition remains the same as in the previous case. It is also the same for the government when ki = ci = 1.
Case 3. Greater impact cost index for government. σ > 1.
If σ > m for somem sufficiently large we have r(k, t)→  for any  > 0 and hence support for the government
is decreasing. The trajectory of government and opposition expenditures are the same as in the previous case.
7 Conclusion.
The aim of this paper has been to make up some of the gap in our theories of the dynamics of competition
between political parties. It was found that both parties increase the effort spent on marketing over time
at an accelerating rate under open loop and closed loop information, although the picture is not so clear
when the government is a leader. In the first two cases it was also found that there is a Red Queen effect.
The contrast between these results and spending by a single party indicates that any observed increase in
marketing effort over time can, in part be explained, by the dynamics of the struggle for support. It does
not require special assumptions about memory on the part of the electorate.
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It was also found that the trajectory of support depended on the relative cost of impact for the government
and opposition. In the case where these costs are equal, or greater for the government, the government loses
support through the entire period except, perhaps, in the case of the Stackelberg game.
It was stressed that this is only a first step in building an analysis of the dynamics of competition. Among
the variants of the model that could be explored are those in which the time of the election is optimally
chosen and in which the amount of resources to be spent are fixed. It would also be possible to explore the
case where the cost and response functions depend on the level of support.
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Appendix 1. A1. Open loop game.
The Hamiltonians are given in Equation (5) and the necessary conditions are given by Equations (6) and (7)
where the terminal conditions on the costates are α1(1) = 1 and α2(1) = −1. Since the Hessian matrices for
the Hamiltonians are negative semi-definite these conditions are also sufficient. The solution for the costates
is
α1(t) = e
−
∫ 1
t
k1u1(t)+k2u2(t) and α2(t) = −e−
∫ 1
t
k1u1(t)+k2u2(t) (14)
which gives α1 = −α2. Writing α = α1 = −α2 for i = 1, 2 gives
u˙1 =
k1
c1
αk2u2 > 0 and u˙2 =
k2
c2
αk1u1 > 0 (15)
and this tells us immediately that
u¨1 =
k1
c1
k2(α˙u2 + αu˙2) > 0 and similarly u¨2 > 0 (16)
To get the trajectory of support for the government substitute Equation (15) into Equation (3). This
gives x˙ = α(k
2
1
c1
(1− x)2 − k22c2 x2)
Notes σ = 1
Substituting for k
2
i
ci
= k into equation (7) gives
α˙ = kα2 (17)
and this gives
x¨ = k(α˙(1− 2x)− 2αx˙) > 0 (18)
and substituting from equation (17) and dividing through by 1− 2x < 0 gives x¨ > 0 because α˙− 2kα2 < 0.
For k1 = k2 = kˆ it follows from equations (6) and (8) and the trajectory for x that u1 < u2 for all t ∈ [0, 1)
and that u˙1 > u˙2 as required.
It is also possible to get explicit solutions for x and ui for i = 1, 2 for σ = 1 for all t, if these are required.
This gives more detail than is necessary for present purposes. In order to do this use equation (17) to give
α(t) =
1
1 + k(1− t) (19)
and substituting into the differential equation for x and solving gives
x(t) =
1
2
(1 + (2x(0)− 1)(α(0)
α(t)
)2) (20)
It is now possible to get the equations for the expenditure of the parties by substituting into equation (6).
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Appendix 2. A 2. Closed loop game.
Solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman partial differential equation. (10)
Solving the optimizing problem for equation (10) for u1 and u2 gives us the analogous expressions to (6)
with the partial differentials ω1x and ω
2
x replacing α1 and α2 ([?], 259-63). Substituting the solutions back
into equation (10) and its counterpart and simplifying gives a system of two partial differential equations
−ω1t = k((ω1x)2
(1− x)2
2
+ ω1xω
2
xx
2) and − ω2t = k((ω2x)2
x2
2
+ ω1xω
2
x(1− x)2) (21)
These equations indicate that there might be a symmetrical solution for ω. Redefine the game in equation
(4) with the payoffs at t = 1 written x(1)− 12 for player one and 12 − x(1) for player two. Since the payoffs
have only been altered by a constant this gives us the equivalent game. Consider solutions of the form
ω1 = ϕ(t)(x(t)− 1
2
) and ω2 = −ϕ(t)(x(t)− 1
2
)
with the boundary conditions derived from the new specification of the game. This means ω1(1) = (x(1)− 12 )
and ω2(1) = −(x(1)− 12 ). This gives ϕ(1) = 1.
Taking the partial differentials of the proposed solution and substituting into (21) gives
−ϕ˙(x− 1
2
) = k(ϕ2
(1− x)2
2
− ϕ2x2) and ϕ˙(x− 1
2
) = k(ϕ2
x2
2
− ϕ2(1− x)2)
and subtracting the first equation from the second and simplifying gives
ϕ˙ =
3k
2
ϕ2
which means
ϕ(t) =
2
2 + 3k(1− t)
and substituting into x˙ in equation (9) and solving gives
x(t) =
1
2
(1 + (2x(0)− 1)(ϕ(0)
ϕ(t)
)
4
3 )
In order to get explicit solutions all that we need to do is substitute into u1(t) = k1c1 (1 − x(t))ϕ(t) and
u2(t) = k2c2 x(t)ϕ(t).
Appendix 3. A3. Stackelberg game.
1. Analysis of costates
The Lagrangean for the problem is Equation (12) where α4(t) is the costate associated with α2 now treated
as a state variable and α5(t) is the multiplier for the condition that must hold for an optimum u2. See ([2],
p.410-12). This gives the necessary conditions for an internal solution as in Equation (13) and
α˙3 = (k1u1 + k2u2)α3 + k2α5α2 (22)
α˙4 = −α4(k1u1 + k2u2) + k2α5x (23)
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with the transversality conditions α3(1) = 1 because the second derivative of the terminal condition is zero
and α4(0) = 0 from ([2], p.412). It is shown below that α3 > 0, α4 < 0 and α˙3 > 0 for all t and that
| α4(1) |≤ k
2
2
c2
∫ 1
0
x2. In order to get α5 we use the fact that ∂L∂u2 = 0 for an internal solution. This gives
α5 =
k2
c2
(−α3x+ α4α2) (24)
Substituting for α5 in equation (24) and solving equation (22) and writing k1u1+k2u2− k2c2 α2x = k1u1+2k2u2
as γ to save notation gives α3 = e
∫ t
0
γdq k2
c2
∫ t
0
α4(α2)2e
−
∫ s
0
γdq
ds+ e
∫ t
0
γds(e−
∫ 1
0
γ − k2c2
∫ 1
0
α4(α2)2e
−
∫ s
0
γdq
ds.
Simplifying this gives
α3 = e
−
∫ 1
t
γds + e
∫ t
0
γds(−k2
c2
∫ 1
t
α4(α2)2e
−
∫ s
0
γdq
ds) (25)
In a similar manner we can solve for (23) to get
α4 = −e−
∫ t
0
γds k
2
2
c2
∫ t
0
α3x
2e
∫ s
0
γdq
ds (26)
It is also possible to get the following information on the costates.
Proposition 2. The signs on the costates are α3 > 0, α4 < 0 and α˙3 > 0 for all t for
k22
c2
> 0.
Proof. Since α4(0) = 0, we get from equation (25) that α3(0) > 0 and hence α3(t) ≥ 0 in some interval
t ∈ [0, ) for some  > 0 and  sufficiently small, since α3 is continuously differentiable. Differentiating α4
at  gives α˙4 = γe
−
∫ 
0
γ

k22
c2
α3x
2e
∫ s
0
γdq − e−
∫ 
0
γ k22
c2
α3x
2e
∫ s
0
γdq
< 0 for  sufficiently small. It follows that
α4(+ δ) < 0 for some δ > 0. Let S be the set S = {t ∈ [0, w) : α4 ≤ 0 and w = sup S}. It is clear that S is
non-empty from what has just been said. Since w = sup S we have α4(w) = 0 and this requires α3(w) = 0 .
This contradicts the fact that for α4(w) = 0 we have α3(w) > 0. It follows immediately that α˙3 > 0.

Proposition 3. | α4(1) |≤ k
2
2
c2
∫ 1
0
x2.
Proof. The mean value theorem for integrals gives | α4(1) | = e−
∫ 1
0
γds
e
∫ s
0
γds k22
c2
∫ 1
0
α3x
2ds ≤ k22c2
∫ 1
0
α3x
2ds.
To complete the proof note that, from Proposition 2, max α3 = 1.

Resource expenditure. σ = 1.
The resource expenditures of the opposition is analysed by first noting from equation (14) and equation (25)
that α(0) > α3(0). Since α4(0) = 0 we have u2(0) > u1(0) as in the open loop game and we again have
u˙2 > 0 and u¨2 > 0
for all t.
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In order to analyse the resource expenditure for the government consider the special case where ki = ci = 1
for i = 1, 2. Differentiating u1 gives
u˙1 = α˙3
k1
c1
(1− x)− x˙k1
c1
α3 + α˙2k1α4 + k1α2α˙4 (27)
which gives
u˙1(0) > 0
for all values of ki and c1 : σ = 1 from α2 < 0, α4(0) = 0, α˙4(0) < 0 and x˙(0) < 0. In order to get the sign
for u˙1 at t = 1 substitute from the previous results into equation (27) and simplify to get
u˙1 = −2α2α3x+ α22α4
and
u¨1 = −2(u1 + u2)α2α3x− α22(−α3x+ α2α4) + α22α4(u1 + u2)− 2α2α3u1
Rewrite u˙1(1) = 2x+ α4 and use the value for α4(1) to get 2x−
∫ 1
0
x2 > 0 for x ≤ 1. This gives
u˙1(1) > 0 and u¨1(0) > 0, u¨1(1) > 0
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